Upgradeability, vertical scaling and control. What these three problems have in common is that people try to duplicate the wrong structure. Bitcoin and Ethereum have transformed so much that they perfectly define how we look at these issues.
We must remember that they were developed at a certain time, and that this time is already in the rather distant past, when blockchain technology was still in its infancy. One of the areas where this time is displayed is management. Bitcoin was launched with evidence of work establishing a Byzantine tolerance for error and introducing the decentralization necessary to create an unreliable ledger that can be used to host digital money.
With the help of Ethereum, Vitalik Buterin sought to popularize the underlying technology so that it could not only be used to host digital money, but also so that developers could program money. With this goal in mind, it made sense to use the consensus algorithm behind the most trusted blockchain: proof of work.
Proof of Work is a mechanism that reduces the Byzantines’ intolerance to errors. Proving that BFT is not as easy as people like to do it. This is not a system of government. Bitcoin doesn’t need an operating system because it’s not a public computer. The reason general purpose computers need a management system is because computers need updating.
There is no need for clearer evidence of the scale of the changes planned for Ethereum 2.0, and no strong advocates for the need for hard forks. We are not the first to point out this problem. The founders of Tezos accurately foresaw this problem, but ultimately failed to provide a protocol that would satisfy the needs of most developers for the following reasons:
The blockchain was not written in smart contracts, but in another language.
They have introduced a political process in which decisions are made in a chain.
They cannot offer an explicit update path in the series.
They failed to create different classes that could serve as checks and balances.
Intelligent smart contracts
Developers should be able to code the behavior they want on the blockchain as smart contracts, and there should be a process in the chain for adding behavior to the system through a clear update path. In short, we need to be able to see the update date accurately so that we can see the history of a specific symbol.
The niche for governance is the definition of smart contracts that are created in “system” contracts depending on whether they add value to the protocol. The challenge, of course, is to agree on this value.
The most controversial point I want to point out is the urgent need for mathematically distinct categories that act as controls and balance each other. While intuition might suggest that multiple classes make it difficult to reach consensus, this is not the case.
First, if promotion candidates are already acting as smart contracts on the backbone, objective calculations can be used to determine whether the ecosystem would benefit from converting a “user” contract into a “system” node. Second, if we don’t hard-fork campaigns, they can be fragmented and targeted. We will only try to assess in a decentralized way whether the system will improve with the change.
Checks and account balances
It is generally accepted that in any economy there are three main factors of production: land (infrastructure), labor and capital. Each major blockchain only recognizes one class: capital. In Proof of Work (PoW) chains, those with the most capital buy the most ASICs and decide which campaigns they can go through. In the Proof of Stake and Proof of Stake authorization chains, capital control is more direct.
The absence of other levels of work, such as capital regulation, is not only problematic on the front page, but also has the paradoxical effect of political paralysis. This is not a homogeneous group. Correctly measured classes create efficiency rather than inefficiency by forcing students to agree in their common interest. Without this pressure, the subcategories (groups in the class) will fight among themselves, leading to a dead end. Well-designed classes motivate participants to reach an internal consensus so that they can increase their influence on the system compared to other classes.
If we can legalize the distinct categories that represent infrastructure, development, and capital, campaigns that receive approval from the three categories should, by definition, add value to the protocol, since these three categories include the collection of stakeholders in any economy.
This control system, combined with a highly scalable platform, can quickly adapt to the needs of developers and end users and become